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SURROGATE SCIENCE AND JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO
AGENCY FINDINGS: HOW THE NINTH CIRCUIT KEEPS
EXEMPTIONS FOR BIOENERGY ON TRACK IN
HELPING HAND TOOLS V. EPA
I. INTRODUCTION
The climate change debate is plainly not a source of political
unity in the United States.1 The questioned efficacy of proposed
solutions to climate change evokes even greater stratification within
partisan circles as a typical constituent’s political alignment predictably demonstrates.2 As a corollary, those at the far reaches of the
political spectrum differ greatly as to their confidence in climate
scientists, and interestingly, the pattern holds true across persons
who claim to possess an elevated scientific understanding.3 This is
not to say, however, that climate change solutions are necessarily
implemented or abandoned according to the whims of the reigning
party, as administrative procedures safeguard against uninformed
policy-making by requiring some underlying rational basis.4 Proposed solutions that originate within the executive branch therefore rely upon scientific findings that corroborate viability and
efficiency.5
The basic premise of one such solution for biomass-burning is
simple—because plants act as a “carbon sink” through photosynthesis, proponents of this solution anticipate that through efficient
1. See generally Cary Funk & Brian Kennedy, The Politics of Climate, PEW RECTR. (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics
-of-climate/ (examining Americans’ diverging views of climate change science and
energy policy, and underlying political affiliations that influence such opinions).
2. See id. (conveying aggregated opinions of 1,534 U.S. adults between May
and June of 2016). While only 9% of conservative Republicans believe “climate
change research reflects the best available evidence most of the time,” 55% of
liberal Democrats do. Id.
3. See id. (noting diminished influence of scientific knowledge on opinions of
climate change science based on political affiliation).
4. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1966) (setting forth “arbitrary” and “capricious” standard of review).
5. See generally Ernest M. Jones, A Component Approach to Minimal Rationality
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 275, 281-82 (1987) (declaring
threshold criteria necessary for proper and effective agency rulemaking). Scholars
posit that rules satisfying the rationality requirement should consider “(1) the conception of the problem addressed by it, (2) the public values at stake in coping
with that problem, (3) the alternatives selected by the rule, (4) the basis for predicting the efficacy of alternatives, and (5) the predictions of the effects of alternatives.” See id.
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methods of cultivation (i.e. replacing cut-down trees immediately),
combustion of biomass stocks may approach “carbon-neutrality,”
where the total carbon dioxide absorbed exceeds the total carbon
dioxide emitted.6 Still, the empirical evidence needed to convince
both legislators and climate change scientists that emissions from
biogenic sources are, in fact, carbon-neutral remains out of reach as
the debate between industry supporters and academic detractors intensifies.7 In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
launched its own investigation to determine the most effective
methods of accounting for biogenic carbon emissions, but has yet
to make lasting, enforceable determinations as to whether biogenic
power generation should be exempt from emissions regulation.8
When facing challenges to the EPA’s temporary determinations, public policy and ethics prohibit judges from “substitut[ing]
their policy preferences for the preferences embodied in the
agency’s rule.”9 The question that remains is what degree of deference must be afforded to interim or unofficial agency preferences
not contained within a binding legal document.10 The inquiry considers not only safeguards against judicial activism, but courts’ duties to strike down unsubstantiated interpretations by agencies that
are sometimes interwoven with political decisions.11 This Note examines these political and judicial tensions through the lens of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Environmental
6. See Zachary Basu, A Burning Question: Throw Wood on the Fire for 21st-Century
Electricity?, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/15/biomassand-climate-change-burning-wood-for-energy-in-21st-century.html (describing forests’ ability to act as “carbon sinks”). While biomass energy resources traditionally
include organic materials sourced from crops and woody plants, the term also refers to algae and combustible gasses harvested from landfills. See Biomass Energy
Basics, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., https://www.nrel.gov/workingwithus/rebiomass.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2018).
7. See Basu, supra note 6 (explaining difficulty in measuring benefits of biomass-burning over short period of time). Critics remain wary of efforts to “legislate
scientific fact” where such facts are newly ascertained. Id. (quoting William Schlesinger, retired scientist and president of the Cary Institute of Ecosystem Studies).
8. Id. (noting EPA’s release of interim guidance for regional permitting authorities in lieu of hard evidence as to efficacy of biogenic power generation as an
environmental control). For a further discussion regarding EPA’s Bioenergy
BACT Guidance, see infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
9. See Jones, supra note 5, at 275 (describing judicial duties faced when applying minimal rationality).
10. For a further discussion of judicial deference to administrative documents, see infra notes 106-127 and accompanying text.
11. See Hillary H. Harnett, New York v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 37
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 589, 602-03 (2013) (discussing standard of review and hard
look doctrines at issue).
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Protection Agency (Helping Hand Tools).12 Part II of this Note explains
the events culminating in Petitioners’ attack on the Environmental
Appeals Board’s decision.13 Part III captures the critical features of
the statutory, regulatory, and judicial landscape.14 Part IV explains
the rationale behind the court’s decision in Helping Hand Tools,
while Part V considers the merits of the court’s holding in favor of
the EPA.15 Lastly, Part VI explains the ramifications of the decision
on both the EPA’s implementation and other courts’ review of similar environmental findings in the future.16
II. FACTS
In Helping Hand Tools, the Ninth Circuit addressed activists’
challenge to a permit for construction of a biomass-burning facility
that was granted without consideration of alternative emission control technologies.17 As noted by the court, the Ninth Circuit had
not previously addressed the EPA’s doctrine of “redefining the
source,” and no circuit had the occasion to examine the EPA’s Best
Available Control Technology (BACT) analysis in the context of
biomass-burning.18
In 2010, Sierra Pacific Industries applied for a Clean Air Act
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit to construct
“a new cogeneration [energy] unit” at an existing biomass-burning
facility in Anderson, California.19 By constructing the unit, Sierra
Pacific intended to increase the facility’s biomass-burning capacity
12. 848 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2016) (addressing Petitioners’ contention that
EPA permitted construction and operation of new power plant in violation of
Clean Air Act).
13. For a discussion of the relevant facts, procedure, and issues on appeal in
Helping Hand Tools, see infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the executive response following enactment of the
Clean Air Act, see infra notes 37-105 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the narrative analysis of the opinion in Helping Hand
Tools, see infra notes 128-156 and accompanying text. For a critique of the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis, see infra notes 157-184 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the examination of the potential consequences of the
Ninth Circuit’s decision, see infra notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
17. See Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d 1185, 1194
(9th Cir. 2016) (explaining petitioners’ primary contention following dismissal by
Environmental Appeals Board).
18. Id. at 1189 (noting novelty of issues at hand).
19. See id.; see also Statement of Basis and Ambient Air Quality Impact Report: Sierra
Pacific Industries-Anderson PSD Permit Number SAC 12-01, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
REGION IX, 1, 3-4 (2012) [hereinafter EPA, AAQIR], https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-R09-OAR-2012-0634-0003&contentType=pdf
(summarizing Sierra Pacific’s project description).
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from 60,000 bone-dry tons (BDT) to 219,000 BDT per year.20 As
fuel, Sierra Pacific sought to use 160,000 BDT of wood waste produced by an adjacent lumber mill while consuming additional
wood transported from the company’s other California facilities.21
The biomass fuel stocks to be consumed thus included mill wastes,
biomass from forest-harvesting and forest-thinning operations, and
agricultural and urban wood waste.22 Acknowledged by the court
in its denial of the petition for review, the EPA and Sierra Pacific
proposed restrictions that prevented Sierra Pacific from removing
trees for the sole purpose of burning them.23
As reported in the EPA’s Statement of Basis and Ambient Air
Quality Impact Report, the plant would serve two purposes as a
cogeneration facility.24 First, it would generate the steam necessary
for Sierra Pacific’s commercial lumber drying processes.25 Second,
it would produce electricity to power Sierra Pacific’s local operations, with any excess diverted to a regional utility operator for sale
on the public electrical grid.26 While the facility would burn natural gas to assist with boiler startup, shutdown, and flame stabilization, Sierra Pacific’s design limited the use of natural gas to no
more than ten percent of the plant’s total fuel consumption.27 As
required by federal regulation, the EPA accepted fifteen public
comments on Sierra Pacific’s draft application, twelve of which
voiced disapproval.28 In 2012, the EPA accepted Sierra Pacific’s
20. See id. at 4 (describing Sierra Pacific’s purpose for expanding capabilities
of plant). A “bone dry ton” refers to an amount of biomass with weight equal to
2,000 pounds and a moisture content of zero percent. J.R. Shelly, Woody Biomass
Definitions and Conversion Factors, U.C. DIV. OF AGRIC. & NAT. RES. (Dec. 6, 2007),
http://ucanr.edu/sites/WoodyBiomass/newsletters/IG003_-_Woody_Biomass_
Definitions_and_Conversions_Factors31510.pdf (detailing common biomass terminology and figures).
21. See id. (comparing existing cogeneration unit with larger proposed woodfired boiler).
22. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1200-01 (describing proposed fuel
blends).
23. See id. (noting limitations of Sierra Pacific’s usage of certain biomass fuel
stocks).
24. See EPA, AAQIR supra note 19, at 4 (outlining twin aims of proposed construction of cogeneration unit at SPI Anderson location).
25. Id. (explaining importance of thermal power plant to Sierra Pacific’s lumber operations).
26. See id. (noting that electricity generated by biomass-burning would exceed
consumption at SPI Anderson facility).
27. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1192 (expounding on Sierra Pacific’s
reasons for limiting usage of natural gas as stated in application for construction
permit).
28. Sierra Pacific Industries, 16 E.A.D. 1, 32 (EAB 2013) (discussing EPA’s determination that project had not generated significant public interest).
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proposal and granted the construction permit while still requiring
adoption of emission controls to curtail the release of non-greenhouse gas pollutants.29
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (CAA), several individuals petitioned for review of the EPA’s decision to grant Sierra Pacific’s permit.30 They argued that the EPA’s analysis conflicted with the CAA
because it failed to consider BACT to curtail carbon dioxide emissions.31 Namely, the petitioners contested the applicant should
have been required to weigh the practicability of using solar power
as an add-on control technology rather than dismissing solar power
outright.32 Furthermore, the petitioners asserted that Sierra Pacific
should have been required to consider the benefits of using a
greater amount of natural gas to fuel its facility.33 In the alternative, they attacked the Bioenergy BACT Guidance promulgated by
the EPA, which had led the government to consider biomass fuels
themselves to be BACT.34 Following partial remand by the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) for the EPA’s failure to hold a public
hearing, two environmentalist groups, Helping Hand Tools and the
Center for Biological Diversity, brought further demands for review
of the final PSD construction permit to the Ninth Circuit.35 Upholding the EPA’s decision and finding that the EAB did not abuse
its discretion, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review and
declined to rehear the decision en banc.36

29. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1192 (detailing chronology of Sierra
Pacific’s PSD permit application).
30. See Sierra Pacific Industries, 16 E.A.D. at 1 (naming litigants who made appearance to contest validity of Sierra Pacific’s PSD permit).
31. See id. at 49 (describing petitioners’ arguments on appeal).
32. See id. (explaining petitioners’ calls for modification of plant design to
incorporate clean technology such as solar power).
33. Id. (detailing petitioners’ claim that cap on usage of natural gas was insufficient for purposes of BACT).
34. See id. at 1199 (interpreting environmental advocates’ secondary claim).
35. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1193 (describing procedure following
EAB’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction). Although the issuer may decline to hold a
public hearing regarding a permitting decision, “the . . . issuer must hold a hearing
whenever there is a ‘significant degree of public interest’ in the draft permit.” See
Sierra Pacific Industries, 16 E.A.D. at 29 (citing 40 § C.F.R. 124.12(a)(1)). The EAB
determined that within such a sparsely populated region, the number of comments received by the permit issuer were enough such that Region Nine abused its
discretion in finding that there was “little indication that the public at large was
interested.” See id. at 33 (reaching opposite conclusion that public was indeed interested in Sierra Pacific project).
36. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1189, 1201 (noting that no judge on
Ninth Circuit had requested vote for rehearing).
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III. BACKGROUND
A. Statutory Backdrop for Regulation of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions
A discussion of the regulatory landscape surrounding greenhouse gasses in the United States begins with the CAA.37 Originally
adopted in 1963, Congress passed the core provisions of the CAA
for the declared purpose of “protect[ing] and enhanc[ing] the
quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare . . . .”38 In 1977 and 1990, Congress amended
the CAA to provide the executive branch with broad enforcement
authority over stationary and mobile sources of air pollutants.39
Congress adopted two permitting schemes: the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD), and Title V procedures.40 The PSD
provisions stipulate that no “major emitting facility” may be constructed unless a permit has been issued following agency review,
and the administrator has held a public hearing for “interested persons” to raise issues concerning the impact of the source and alternatives available to the applicant.41 Among other requirements
within the mandated PSD permitting procedures, Congress stated
that proposed facilities are “subject to the [B]est [A]vailable
[C]ontrol [T]echnology for each [emitted] pollutant subject to
regulation . . . .”42 The provisions thus compel operators to employ
Best Available Control Technology (BACT) to minimize pollutant
emissions from both new and modified sources where emissions
substantially exceed previously observed levels.43 In conjunction
with the PSD provisions, sub-sections under Title V of the Act make
unlawful the operation of major emitting facilities without similar
permits.44
37. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1990) (providing statutory grant of
power for regulation of atmospheric pollutants in accordance with contemporary
public health concerns).
38. § 7401(b)(1) (articulating purpose of legislation).
39. See generally §§ 7470, 7525 (outlining goals of Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality and Motor Vehicle Emission and Fuel Standards
provisions).
40. See generally §§ 7470, 7661a (outlining new requirements for stationary
sources to be enforced by executive branch).
41. See § 7475(a)(1-2) (discussing statutory mandate for public hearing).
42. § 7475(a)(4) (promoting adoption of emerging emissions control technologies where national benefit may be realized) (emphasis added).
43. See § 7475(a)(3) (explaining emissions thresholds set forth by statute).
44. See generally § 7475 (discussing need for major emitting facilities to obtain
permits); see also 7661a (defining “major source[s]” for which operation requires
compliance with CAA amendments).
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Congress further promulgated restrictions on pollutant
sources in the face of controversy by requiring the EPA to implement vehicle emissions testing.45 Until 2007, no binding construction of the term “pollutant” within the CAA supported the EPA’s
regulation of greenhouse gasses; the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Massachusetts),46 however, addressed this very issue.47 In a landmark five-to-four
decision, the Court determined that “air pollutant[s] . . . which may
reasonably . . . endanger public health or welfare” could include
greenhouse gasses under the “otherwise-unambiguous” statute if
the EPA made the determination that greenhouse gasses did in fact
pose such danger.48
In the aftermath of Massachusetts, the EPA engaged in a comprehensive expansion of its rules governing acceptable emissions
thresholds and formally adopted the view that the Act mandates
regulation of pollutants released by any and all sources, including
greenhouse gasses.49 Taking notice, however, of the fact that the
CAA’s permitting procedures triggered upon annual release of either 100 or 250 tons of pollutants, the Agency carved back the applicability of the PSD permitting program to greenhouse gas
emissions by announcing its Prevention of Significant Deterioration
and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule50 (Tailoring Rule).51
The rule purported to effect a “phase-in” process in the interest of
45. § 7521 (enabling vehicle emissions testing). Pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), the “[a]dministrator shall . . . prescribe . . . standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Id.
(specifying pollutants within EPA’s purview) (emphasis added).
46. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
47. Id. at 510-15 (reviewing claims on appeal from D.C. Circuit, which dismissed petitions for agency rulemaking filed in response to EPA’s refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions). An environmental organization filed suit against
Massachusetts alleging that its failure to regulate carbon dioxide through tailpipe
emissions inspections would contribute to an increase in global temperatures resulting in sea level rise, which posed an actual and imminent threat to Massachusetts and its residents. See id. at 510, 521-526.
48. See id. at 500-01 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1)) (articulating EPA’s authorization to regulate greenhouse gasses).
49. For a further discussion of agency action expanding air pollution controls, see New Source Review Workshop Manual, infra notes 58, 63 and accompanying
text.
50. 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51,
52, 70) (setting forth three-step plan for alleviating compliance woes of affected
source operators).
51. See id. (seeking to reduce burden on administrative agencies). The EPA
recognized that the triggering threshold of 100 or 250 tons per year (tpy) was a low
bar for greenhouse gas emissions in comparison to emissions rates for conven-
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conserving administrative resources by modifying statutory triggering thresholds to avoid sweeping numerous smaller sources, such as
motor vehicles, under the Act’s purview.52 Opponents of the Tailoring Rule, however, mounted a successful challenge in Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.53 Justice
Scalia’s majority reigned-in the Agency’s greenhouse gas regulations, recognizing that “[Massachusetts] did not hold that [the] EPA
must always regulate greenhouse gases as [ ] ‘air pollutant[s]’ everywhere [the] term appears in the statute, but only that [the] EPA
must ‘ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute,’
rather than on ‘reasoning divorced from the statutory text.’ ”54 The
Court held that greenhouse gas emissions alone do not force operators to comply with permitting procedures, yet the EPA could regulate sources already subject to PSD procedures due to their release
of airborne pollutants other than greenhouse gasses.55 Crucial to
the Court’s reasoning was the notion that “consistent usage” of the
term air pollutant under the CAA “readily yields to context” and
within the legislative scheme of the PSD and Title V permitting procedures, the EPA had room to distinguish greenhouse gasses from
other pollutants.56
B. The EPA’s 1990 BACT Guidance
As defined by Congress, BACT is an analysis conducted on a
“case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and
economic impacts and other costs . . . ,” and conditioning project
approval upon implementation of appropriate technology as set
tional pollutants, and instead proposed a new triggering threshold for carbon dioxide “in a range between 10,000 and 25,000 tpy.” See id. at 31,518.
52. See id. (scaling back extent of regulation to encompass only large sources
intended to be covered under PSD and Title V enabling statutes).
53. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (avoiding crippling effects of sweeping CAA application). Challengers to the Tailoring Rule included the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Chemistry Council, and several states including Texas, Florida, Georgia, North
Dakota and South Carolina. Id. at 2433 (listing petitioners and respondents).
54. Id. at 2440-41. (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S.
Ct. at 1438) (citation omitted). Although the Court’s holding eliminated the construction that regulatory compliance is mandatory for all sources, the Court duly
noted that, regardless, the vast majority of stationary sources nation-wide are already subject to PSD permitting procedures. See id. at 2449.
55. See id. (holding that EPA was within delegated powers to regulate greenhouse gasses).
56. See id. at 2432, 2441-42 (articulating court’s partial holding in favor of
EPA).
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forth by the Administrator.57 The EPA’s New Source Review Workshop Draft Manual defines a five-step, top-down process by which a
permitting authority determines whether the applicant seeks to employ the best available control technology in its design.58 Most
noteworthy is step one, in which the applicant must make a goodfaith effort to “identify . . . all available control options . . . with a
practical potential for application to the emissions unit and the regulated pollutant under evaluation.”59 In steps two and three, the
EPA evaluates the feasibility of the control options and ranks each
technically feasible solution according to expected emissions, economic, environmental, and energy impacts.60 In step four, the applicant validates that the top-ranked control option is the best
solution and provides justification for why collateral environmental
impacts do not warrant implementation of an alternative.61 At step
five, the EPA accepts the applicant’s selection.62
Although the EPA’s BACT guidance was promulgated according to congressional intent that operators of pollutant emitting
sources implement modern technology when feasible, the EPA has
long supported that where “considering available control alternatives” would “redefine the design of the source,” a full BACT analysis need not be undertaken.63 The EPA’s exception in such
scenarios has led to a flurry of litigation and has received varying
degrees of reception in appellate courts, culminating in the decision discussed in Helping Hand Tools.64
In Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Sierra
Club),65 the Seventh Circuit considered a petition for review of the
permit in question in Prairie State Generating Co. (Prairie State),66
wherein the EAB determined that permit issuers are under no duty
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (1990) (outlining “best available control technology” standard for future delineation by administrative agencies).
58. See New Source Review Workshop Manual: Prevention of Significant Deterioration
and Nonattainment Area Permitting (Oct. 1990), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/nsr/nsr-workshop-manual-draft-october-1990 [hereinafter New Source
Review Workshop Manual] (describing agency draft guidance).
59. Id. at B.5, B.11 (articulating BACT step one) (internal quotations
omitted).
60. Id. at B.6 (describing BACT steps two and three).
61. See id. at B.6, B.8-B.9 (setting out fourth step in BACT process).
62. See id. at B.9 (concluding BACT selection process).
63. See New Source Review Workshop Manual, supra note 58, at B.13 (announcing
source redefinition exception).
64. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d 1185, 1190-91 (9th Cir. 2016) (describing
novelty of biogenic fuel in context of BACT analysis).
65. 499 F.3d 653, 653 (7th Cir. 2007) (reviewing EAB’s decision upholding
permit for construction of power plant).
66. 13 E.A.D. 1 (EAB 2006).
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to consider alternative control technologies on their own.67 The
EPA argued that where alternative technology would undermine a
project’s basic business purpose, those alternatives may be eliminated entirely at step one of the BACT analysis.68 Holding in favor
of the EPA, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged and rejected the
concern that applicants seeking to build power generation facilities
can circumvent PSD and Title V requirements by simply making a
certain fuel source an inherent aspect of the facility’s design.69
Judge Posner deferred to the EPA’s determination that considering
all alternatives, clean fuels would be a “Sisyphean labor,” but Judge
Posner did acknowledge that the dividing line between control
technologies and the facility’s inherent design is now blurred.70
While offering words of caution in approaching the “crucial question where control technology ends and a redesign of the ‘proposed facility’ begins,” the court found it best to allow the EPA final
word in light of limited statutory guidance.71
The EAB in Desert Rock Energy Company72 heard petitions for
review of a PSD permit from the Navajo Nation and others, who
challenged on grounds that the EPA failed to apply the proper standard when considering a source redefinition exception.73 The
67. See id. at 26. In Prairie State, several public health advocates raised objections to the Illinois EPA’s granting of a permit for construction of a coal-fueled
power plant to be built at the mouth of a coal mine. Id. at 1 (detailing petitioners’
claims). The coal to be extracted and subsequently burned at the generating plant
had a relatively high-sulfur content and was therefore less clean than other types of
coal that were only available from far-away sources. See id. (noting characteristics of
alternative fuel source that would redefine scope of project). Petitioners requested the EPA require consideration of coal sources that were not co-located
with the facility. See id. at 22 (explaining petitioners’ argument on appeal). The
Appeals Board did, however, restrain its ruling, adding that the “redefining the
source” rationale should be used only to eliminate inherently lower-emitting
processes, not add-on controls. See id. at 16 (concluding that agency guidance does
not permit exclusion of add-on controls from BACT analysis).
68. See Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 499 F.3d 653, 654 (pointing to
source-redefinition exception as accepted in prior decisions and guidance
documentation).
69. See id. (eschewing discussion of applicants’ potential bad-faith definition
of business purpose).
70. See id. at 655 (holding that EPA need not consider fuel sources in step one
of BACT analysis).
71. See id. at 656 (acknowledging court was faced with “borderline case” such
that tribunals encountering similar questions in future should proceed with
caution).
72. 14 E.A.D. 484, 1 (EAB 2009).
73. See id. at 36 (considering whether regional EPA properly granted permit
for construction of coal-fired power plant). Petitioners sought to prevent EPA’s
Region Nine office from issuing a PSD permit to Desert Rock for construction of a
coal-fired electric generating plant. Id. at 1 (summarizing third parties’ attempts to
challenge applicant’s planned local activities).
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Board articulated a two-step process by which it purported to hold
applicants accountable and avoid the concerns briefly raised in Sierra Club.74 First, “the permit applicant initially ‘defines the proposed facility’s end, object, aim, or purpose—that is the facility’s
basic design.’ ”75 Second, the EPA takes a “hard look” to determine
when an aspect of a facility’s design is inherent to its purpose such
that change would redefine the source.76 Remanding the entire petition to the regional permit issuer, the EAB determined that the
EPA abused its discretion by failing to take a hard look at whether
use of a particular control technology would require modification
of an inherent aspect of the facility’s design.77 While the regional
permit issuer thoroughly explained why the control technology was
not technically or economically viable within the project, the EAB
determined that questions of feasibility must be addressed at step
four of the BACT process rather than step one.78 The EAB held
that the BACT analysis was a crucial aspect of the PSD permitting
process and thus should be afforded complete attention.79
C. Special Rules for Biogenic Carbon Dioxide
In November 2010, the EPA released additional documentation to guide source operators and officials through the review of
PSD applications where greenhouse gasses are expected to be released.80 While noting that “[t]he fundamental aspects of the PSD
and title V permitting programs are generally not affected by the
integration of [greenhouse gases] into these programs,” the EPA
declared that certain types of biomass-burning operations should
74. See id. at 36 (adopting EAB’s test as set forth in Prairie State).
75. See id. (describing applicant’s responsibilities to define scope of project).
76. See id. (defining permit issuer’s duty to stringently view applicant’s good
faith definition of project).
77. See Desert Rock Energy Co., 14 E.A.D. at 38 (holding that BACT analysis was
not properly conducted). The proposed alternative control technology, an Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC), would convert coal into a cleanable
synthetic gas before being burned—allowing the source operator to remove various “particulate matter, mercury, sulfur compounds, ammonia, and other acid
gases” that would otherwise be released when burning unconverted coal. Id. at 32
(describing advantages of burning coal through IGCC).
78. See id. at 31 (holding that step four merits consideration of “issues surrounding the relative cost effectiveness of the alternative technologies”).
79. See id. at 28, 30 (restating importance of BACT process for proper enforcement of CAA provisions).
80. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, PSD and Title V Permitting
Guidance for Greenhouse Gases 1, 4 (Nov. 2010), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/ghgpermittingguidance
.pdf [hereinafter Greenhouse Gas Guidance] (explaining differences between 1990
Draft Guidance and guidance for greenhouse gases).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

11

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7

350 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX: p. 339
be given special consideration under the traditional BACT framework.81 Although it had not yet made the requisite scientific determinations that would enable permanent rulemaking, the EPA
indicated it would allow permitting authorities to conclude, in
some instances, that “certain types of biomass [fuels] by themselves
are BACT for GHGs.”82
In March 2011, the EPA released interim guidance supplementing both the 1990 BACT framework and November 2010 documentation to the extent they address carbon dioxide emissions
from biomass-burning.83 Recommending that “permitting authorities apply the analytical framework recently articulated by the Environmental Appeals Board[,]” the EPA expounded upon its position
that “in most cases . . . utilization of biomass fuel alone is BACT for
a bioenergy facility.”84 Further, the documentation provides that
“where . . . biogenic fuel is fundamental to the primary purpose of
the project . . . permitting authorities can rely on that to determine
that use of another fuel would redefine the proposed source.”85
The guidance directs permit issuers to apply the traditional topdown BACT analysis articulated in its November 2010 guidance,
with several modifications.86
First, the EPA called explicit attention to the source redefinition exception upheld in several Environmental Appeals Board decisions.87 Presumably recognizing that facilities most often burn
biomass as a primary fuel source rather than a secondary source,
the EPA explained that making use of the source redefinition exception would reduce the number of alternative control technolo-

81. See id. at 4, 9 (announcing that EPA intended to release future BACT
guidance in light of biomass stocks’ potential to act as greenhouse gas “sinks”).
82. See id. at 9 (acknowledging departure from general conception of control
technology).
83. Office of Air and Radiation, Guidance for Determining Best Available Control
Technology for Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Bioenergy Production 1, 3-4 (Mar.
2011), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-12/documents/bioenergyguidance.pdf [hereinafter Bioenergy Guidance] (providing permitting authorities and applicants with guidance in lieu of pending rules
favoring implementation of biogenic fuel generation).
84. See id. at 5, 12 (declining to extend special BACT consideration for biogenic fuels as far as Greenhouse Gas Guidance).
85. Id. at 15 (applying source redefinition exemption).
86. See id. at 15-16, 20-30 (noting special considerations within traditional
BACT analysis for biogenic sources). For an overview of the EPA’s top-down BACT
analysis, see supra notes 57-79 and accompanying text.
87. See id. at 15-16 (encouraging usage of exception by regional permitting
authorities).
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gies available for consideration at step one.88 Second, the EPA
noted modifications to traditional circumstances under step four
that would be afforded special consideration for bioenergy
sources.89 For instance, issuers are now encouraged to consider
beneficial carbon sequestration properties of biomass stocks when
determining environmental effects of the source.90 Under this latest guidance, the EPA recognized that add-on controls for carbon
dioxide can often be eliminated from consideration by both the
applicant and the permit issuer due to extortionate annual costs.91
The agency also cited economic benefits to local communities that
weigh in favor of selecting biomass burning as BACT.92 Finally, the
EPA noted that, because its tentative findings and evidence offered
at public comment suggested that certain biomass stocks had a negative net contribution to atmospheric carbon dioxide levels, its conclusions were limited solely to those fuels until further research
could be conducted.93 Qualifying its findings, however, the EPA
determined that formal adoption of the rule required “further discussion with partners and scientists both inside and outside the federal government, as well as engagement with an independent
scientific panel, before it [could] make more qualitative characterizations beyond [those pertaining to mill residues].”94
Later in 2011, the EPA announced a new rule titled Deferral
for CO2 Emissions from Bioenergy and Other Biogenic Sources
Under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) and Title
V Programs,95 which delayed the effective date of regulations per88. See Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 1-15 (explaining advantages of
source redefinition exception in context of biomass-burning).
89. See id. at 20-30 (detailing differences at step four between original Greenhouse Gas Guidance and Bioenergy Guidance). The prospective sequestration of carbon dioxide over the lifespan of the biomass stocks is given special consideration at
this step because other fuel sources lack similar beneficial collateral effects. Id. at
20-21.
90. See id. at 20-24 (summarizing EPA’s factual determinations to date regarding carbon neutrality of biomass stocks).
91. See id. at 24-25 (raising presumption that add-on controls for bioenergy
facilities are often too costly for operators to implement).
92. See id. at 25-27 (noting potential job creation and stimulation of regional
economies).
93. See Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 29 (limiting effect of EPA’s conclusions). The EPA’s conclusion that mill residue materials such as wood shavings,
scraps, and chips have a negligible impact on the net carbon cycle and thus should
not require emissions reduction strategies hinges upon the fact that such materials
“would otherwise decompose in a [ten to fifteen] year time frame.” See id.
94. Id. at 24 (restraining scientific conclusions regarding beneficial effects of
burning other biomass fuels).
95. 76 Fed. Reg. 43,490 (July 20, 2011) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 51, 52, 70,
71).
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taining to biogenic carbon dioxide sources that have a de minimis
effect on atmospheric carbon content.96 While the EPA originally
declined to allow any permitting exemptions for operators of biogenic carbon dioxide sources when drafting its Tailoring Rule a
year earlier, it later reconsidered after inviting public comment on
the topic.97 Developing its directive based upon information submitted by interested groups, the EPA issued its final rule deferring
regulation of biogenic carbon dioxide emissions for three years:98
The information . . . indicates that at present attempting
to determine the net carbon cycle impact of [biomass
combustion] would require extensive analysis and would
therefore entail extensive workload requirements by many
of the permitting authorities . . . . [T]hese uncertainties
and complexities [in contrast to other sources] are exacerbated because of the unique role and impact biogenic
sources of CO2 have in the carbon cycle. Further, methodologies are not sufficiently developed to assure that various permitting authorities would be able to perform the
necessary calculations reasonably and consistently to determine the net atmospheric impact in many, if not all,
instances.99
The EPA noted that it would engage in its own, independent research while the deferral period was active.100
In Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency,101 however, several environmental groups challenged the
“Deferral Rule” on grounds that the EPA’s rationale was arbitrary
and capricious.102 Specifically, petitioners argued the rule contravened the plain language of the CAA, and that, by refusing to regulate greenhouse gasses emitted by biomass-burning sources, the
EPA shirked its duties as defined by Congress.103 While declining
96. See id. at 43,492 (establishing that, for duration of temporary deferral, biogenic fuel sources are to be treated as if carbon neutral).
97. See id. (detailing outcry at Call for Information that motivated EPA’s initial proposal of regulation).
98. See id. (detailing timeline of passage of regulation).
99. Id. at 43,422 (quoting EPA’s stated purpose of regulation).
100. See id. (justifying exemption of bioenergy sources from Tailoring Rule as
providing time necessary to carry out research into carbon cycle impacts).
101. 722 F.3d 401 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
102. See id. at 404 (reviewing Deferral Rule in light of Supreme Court’s interpretation of “air pollutant” in Massachusetts).
103. See id. at 408-09 (stating petitioners’ claim that EPA failed to adequately
justify conclusions leading to proposal of rule).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss2/7

14

Schmid: Surrogate Science and Judicial Deference to Agency Findings: How

2018]

SURROGATE SCIENCE

AND

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

353

to answer the question of whether “the Clean Air Act unambiguously requires the regulation of all carbon dioxide from whatever
source,” the court held in favor of petitioners, vacating the Deferral
Rule.104 Because the EPA did not satisfy the requirements of the
administrative doctrines governing its delay of mandated regulation, the majority held that the EPA’s basis for creating the rule was
both arbitrary and capricious without considering the EPA’s justification for singling out GHGs that originate from bioenergy
facilities.105
D. Deference Due to Administrative Guidance
As applied in the cases discussed above, agency action is reviewed under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard established by
the Administrative Procedure Act.106 Such an assessment necessitates not only a look into the outcome of the case at bar, but also an
examination of the agency’s supporting facts and conclusions of
law.107 The level of deference due to agency findings thus merits
additional questions: the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.108 governs various courts’ determinations as to whether to leave executive findings
or conclusions undisturbed.109 The Court articulated two steps:
104. See id. at 409, 412 (reciting EPA’s statement of purpose as written in text
of regulation in articulating disposition).
105. See id. at 411-12 (declining to accept claims while holding in favor of
petitioners). In the concurring opinion, however, Judge Kavanaugh did discuss
the issue avoided by the majority, reasoning that the text of the CAA contains no
basis for “distinguish[ing] biogenic carbon dioxide from other sources of carbon
dioxide that EPA is required . . . to regulate.” Id. at 412 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (relying on textualists’ position). On the issue of whether the CAA required
equal regulation of all pollutants, the concurrence answered in the affirmative. See
id. at 413 (holding statute was unambiguous).
106. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). For examples of the courts’ review of decisions
made by regional offices of the EPA, see supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
107. See Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d 1185, 1194
(9th Cir. 2016) (conducting stringent inquiry into rationale behind agency decision). “ ‘We do not simply review whether it was arbitrary or capricious’ for the
Board to reject a petitioner’s claims that EPA clearly erred. ‘Rather, we conduct a
deferential review of the entire agency action,’ including whether approval of the
PSD permit is based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law.”
Id. (quoting Citizens for Clean Air v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 959 F.2d 839, 845-46
(9th Cir. 1992)) (citation omitted) (reciting deferential standard applicable to
agency actions).
108. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
109. See id. at 842-44 (setting forth framework for review of agency construction of ambiguous statutory terms). The Court reviewed the petitioners’ claim that
the EPA impermissibly construed the term “stationary source” as recorded in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. See id. at 838. While Congress left the term
undefined, the Court of Appeals concluded that the EPA’s subsequent establish-
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“First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear . . .
the court, as well as the agency must give effect to [the statute].”110
Otherwise, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous . . . the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”111 In such cases, deference is afforded
to agency constructions that are neither “arbitrary, capricious,
[n]or manifestly contrary to the statute.”112
On the question of whether certain types of agency findings
merit departure from the Chevron framework, Christensen v. Harris
County113 and United States v. Mead Corp.114 provide insight.115 Christensen stands for the notion that agency interpretations of statutory
provisions are not entitled to deference when adopted through informal procedures.116 In Mead, the Court further carved back the
immutability of agency interpretations, explaining that where Congress “[does not] delegate[ ] authority to the agency generally to
ment of a more lenient permitting scheme and accompanying air pollutant emissions standard based on its own construction of the term was “inappropriate.” See
id. at 841-42 (describing appellate court’s findings).
110. Id. at 842-43 (stating first inquiry of Chevron analysis).
111. Id. at 843 (reciting second inquiry of Court’s framework).
112. See id. at 843-44 (specifying underlying Agency determinations that
Court must examine). In Chevron, the meaning of the term adopted by the EPA
had neither been approved nor discouraged by specific language in the CAA
Amendments. See id. at 851 (analyzing 1977 Amendments). The legislative history,
however, indicated that Congress was sensitive to the tension between the economic
interests of source operators in less stringent emissions standards and the public
interests in reducing air pollution such that it sought to further both pursuits. Id.
Further militating in favor of the EPA’s interpretation was the argument that
judges should generally maintain respect for agency determinations as members of
the executive branch are accountable “to the people.” See id. at 865-66.
113. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
114. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
115. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. at 585 (effectuating escape
from primacy of Chevron standard); see United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218 at
219-20 (revisiting Chevron paradigm); see also Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of
Administrative Law: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107 DICK. L. REV. 289, 304-16 (2002) (describing
evolution of deference principles); see also Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1571-72 (2007) (pronouncing return of deference doctrine to
original expertise factors).
116. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-87 (bifurcating administrative determinations on basis of agencies’ adherence to rulemaking procedures).
[I]nterpretation[s] contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.
Id. at 587.
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make rules carrying the force of law, [or] that the agency interpretation claiming deference was [not] promulgated in the exercise of
[that] authority,” then no Chevron deference need be given to the
agency’s interpretation.117
Collectively, therefore, precedent supports that unofficial or informal agency findings such as those found in letters, office manuals, or guidance documents are not granted Chevron deference if
not intended by Congress to carry the “force of law.”118 Rather,
under the Court’s earlier decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,119 such
agency policy statements are not controlling upon courts, but may
be given weight dependent on the “thoroughness evident in [their]
consideration, the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give [them] power to persuade . . . .”120
Even where courts decline to engage in discourse over the application of Skidmore and its progeny to a particular set of facts, the
scientific nature of an agency’s determination has led courts to
grant administrators wide latitude when interpreting statutes.121 In
Baltimore Gas & Electric Company v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,122 the Supreme Court heard challenges to a regulation published by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).123 For purposes of
the statute, the NRC formally adopted the view that “permanent
117. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27 (defining additional criteria meriting consideration in light of Christensen).
118. See The Two Faces of Chevron, supra note 115, at 1579 (describing courts’
avoidance of Chevron standard).
119. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
120. Id. at 140 (defining factors relevant to courts’ determination of persuasive value of agency policy statements); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Skidmore’s standard
where administrative interpretation of statute did not carry force of law). While
still valid law post-Chevron, Christensen, and Mead, Skidmore faces criticisms that its
test is “vague and indeterminate,” and leaves “so much discretion in the hands of
trial (or appellate) judges . . . that the test . . . seem[s] to sanction granting no
deference at all.” See Womack, supra note 115, at 294.
Skidmore review looks to the context of the agency’s interpretation, including
especially its expertise in the subject area, whereas Chevron focuses on the correspondence between the agency’s interpretation and Congress’s intent. Accordingly, a court might find an agency’s expert interpretation persuasive, but had it
gone through the Chevron inquiry it might have found that Congress had clearly
indicated a different interpretation, which would have ended the analysis.
See The Two Faces of Chevron, supra note 115, at 1579.
121. See generally Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (discussing standard of review affording highest deference to
agency action).
122. 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
123. See id. (describing events leading to litigation at hand).
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storage of certain nuclear wastes would have no significant environmental impact” because methods of storage, which would greatly
reduce the risk of leakage, would likely be developed in the future.124 Dismissing petitioner’s claims that the regulation was arbitrary and capricious, the Court closely contemplated the record,
which consisted of thousands of pages of testimony, oral hearings, a
137-page report, and multiple studies conducted by the Commission itself.125 Because the Commissioner’s predictions were “within
its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science” and substantial support was contained within the record, the administrative
determination was “within the bounds of reasoned decisionmaking.”126 While the Court made no mention of the Skidmore line of
cases nor drew attention to any binding effect of the assumption
outside of the NRC’s licensing decisions, the Court nevertheless afforded the Commission the utmost level of deference: “[w]hen examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple
findings of fact, a reviewing court must generally be at its most
deferential.”127
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
Denying petitioners’ calls for review on the grounds that the
EAB’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Helping Hand Tools first relied upon
124. Id. at 98 (explaining rationale behind NRC’s zero-release assumption).
125. See id. at 98 n.11 (pointing out substantial evidence used by Commission
to arrive at zero-release assumption).
126. See id. at 103-04 (articulating Court’s core holding). Scholars point out
that the Court’s deference in Baltimore Gas & Electric was afforded not simply on
the complexity of the subject matter and the degree of expertise required to reach
the Commission’s conclusion, but was also offered under the view that such conclusions constitute an adoption of policy reserved only for branches bound directly
by the electorate—a privilege that should remain undisturbed by the judiciary. See
Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference: The Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 761 (2011) (quoting Baltimore
Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. 87, 105) (drawing attention to Court’s secondary avenue of
justification for deferential review).
127. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 103 (setting forth level of deference
due to agency findings involving scientific expertise). Baltimore Gas & Electric is
one of only a handful of cases in which the Supreme Court afforded its “most
deferential” standard to agency action. See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 519-20 (1978) (deferring to
Atomic Energy Commission’s adoption of rulemaking procedures as fulfilling Congressional requirements for federal agencies); see also Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 360 (1989) (upholding agency decision to decline to prepare
supplemental environmental impact statement to address alleged adverse effects of
dam construction on water turbidity).
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the foregoing analysis of the Seventh Circuit in Sierra Club.128 First,
the Ninth Circuit determined the EPA reasonably concluded that
considering fuel sources other than biomass would impermissibly
redefine the source.129 Second, addressing petitioners’ novel claim
that the EPA should not have considered biomass alone in step one
of its BACT analysis in accordance with its Bioenergy Guidance, the
court found that the EPA’s reliance on special expertise placed it at
the “frontiers of science” and justified departure from the traditional BACT analysis.130 The Ninth Circuit expressed uncertainty
as to the level of deference that should be given to the EPA’s BACT
guidance and therefore avoided discussion as to its legal effect.131
A. Adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s Framework in Sierra Club
Sustaining the Ninth Circuit’s long-applied principle that permitting authorities need not consider implementation of control
technologies that would disrupt the project’s basic business purpose, the court mirrored the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Sierra
Club.132 The court grounded its reasoning in the project descriptions accompanying both Sierra Pacific’s application and the EPA’s
issued permit, which designated the use of co-located biomass fuels
as part of the facility’s inherent design.133 Similar to Judge Posner’s
review of the EAB’s decision in Prairie State, the Ninth Circuit narrowly construed the applicant’s basic business purpose—in the
noted case, the use of on-site wood waste—to the greatest extent
possible.134 Acknowledging that Sierra Pacific’s self-defined business purpose would govern application of the source redefinition
128. Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d 1185, 1194
(9th Cir. 2016) (explaining justification was “guided by well-reasoned decisions of
Board and the Seventh Circuit”).
129. See id. at 1198 (setting forth Ninth Circuit’s holding on petitioners’ first
claim).
130. See id. at 1198-99 (discussing petitioners’ alternative claim and analyzing
under Baltimore Gas & Electric rather than Chevron and Skidmore).
131. See id. at 1199 (noting aspects of guidance which evidenced non-binding
treatment by EPA). The court avoided addressing the extent of legal effect of the
guidance by noting that the court need not consider it since the EPA’s actions
were “neither arbitrary or capricious,” as discussed later in the opinion. See id.
132. Compare id. at 1197 (reiterating Seventh Circuit’s credence to EPA’s longheld and widely accepted exception) with Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
499 F.3d 653, 656-67 (7th Cir. 2007) (distinguishing between decisions to adopt
control technologies and decisions to redesign proposed project).
133. Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1197 (granting leeway to Sierra Pacific’s
application’s design aspects of biomass burning facility).
134. Id. (recognizing rejection of petitioners’ broad view of facility’s basic business purpose as “generat[ing] steam for lumber drying kilns and [making]
electricity”).
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exception, the court took a “hard look” at the appropriateness of
Sierra Pacific’s project definition and was satisfied that the applicant had not unreasonably limited its goals for constructing the
bioenergy facility.135
While noting that, traditionally, the BACT analysis would compel consideration of a higher natural-gas-to-biomass ratio, the Ninth
Circuit swiftly resolved the “borderline” case at hand as the Seventh
Circuit did in Sierra Club.136 Again, the court’s narrow determination of Sierra Pacific’s basic business purpose led it to agree that
greater usage of natural gas would run afoul of the facility’s inherent design.137 To solidify its justification, the Ninth Circuit declined to involve itself further in the technical aspects of the
doctrine, holding that “[d]rawing the line between control technology and redefining the source is a technical determination to which
a court should defer to [the] EPA.”138 The court reaffirmed Judge
Posner’s pronouncement that it “makes sense” to let the EPA, as
author, draw the line “where control technology ends and a redesign of the ‘proposed facility’ begins.”139
B. A “Hands-off” Approach to the Agency’s Modified BACT
Analysis for Biogenic Fuel
The Ninth Circuit’s dismissal of petitioners’ alternative challenges likewise relied upon deferential views of agency action.140
Observing that agency construction of statutory ambiguity is permissible unless “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute,” the court addressed the EPA’s implementation of gui135. See id. (analogizing location of bioenergy unit adjacent to biomass fuel
stocks to coal-fired plant adjacent to mine in Prairie State).
136. See id. at 1197-98 (distinguishing local access to both dirty biomass and
clean natural gas from off-site access to low-sulfur fuel in Sierra Club).
137. Id. at 1198 (reasoning that usage of natural gas was incidental to usage of
biomass). “Greater utilization of a fuel that the applicant is already proposing to
use in some aspect of the project design should be listed as an option in Step 1
unless it can be demonstrated that such an option would disrupt the applicant’s
basic business purpose for the proposed facility.” Id. (quoting Greenhouse Gas Guidance, supra note 80).
138. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1198 (citing Sierra Club v. U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency, 499 F.3d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2007)) (applying heightened deference
when faced with technical determinations as to projects’ business purposes).
139. See id. (citing Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655) (deferring to EPA determinations in borderline cases where changes to design are proposed).
140. See id. at 1198-1201 (summarizing holding on petitioners’ challenge regarding EPA’s findings and suggested procedures contained in Bioenergy BACT
Guidance).
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dance materials for biogenic fuel sources.141 The court acknowledged Chevron and Skidmore, admitting that the weight afforded to
informal agency determinations depends upon its “thoroughness,
rational validity, and consistency with prior and subsequent pronouncements.”142 Namely, the court pointed to the case-by-case application of the guidance documents to permit requests and the
fact that the EPA drafted the guidance so as not to carry the force
of law.143 Finding, however, that the agency’s action occurred
against the backdrop of its special expertise or at the “frontiers of
science,” the Ninth Circuit ruled that a court should “be at its most
deferential” under Baltimore Gas & Electric.144 The court declined
to reach any determination on the level of deference to be given to
the guidance itself.145 Even if the March 2011 guidance was afforded minimal significance, the agency’s action under review was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.146
In support of its assertion, the court drew attention to the
EPA’s authority to modify and rely on its top-down BACT approach.147 Although petitioners questioned the EPA’s inclusion of
biomass-burning as the sole, stand-alone control technology in step
one, the Ninth Circuit determined that the EPA’s limiting of available options at the outset of the analysis was reasonable.148 The
court found persuasive the EPA’s argument that even though utilization of biogenic fuel does not itself curtail emissions of greenhouse gasses, biomass-burning at the EPA’s prescribed limits could
qualify as a “baseline” by which to compare the effects of add-on
control technology.149
141. Id. at 1199 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)) (describing standard of review of agency action).
142. Id. (quoting Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051,
1068 (9th Cir. 2003)) (discussing factors relevant to determine whether courts
should respect administrative guidance).
143. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1199 (citing reasons why court found
legal effect of guidance documents unclear).
144. See id. (quoting Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)) (eschewing analysis under Mead and Skidmore, and instead
subjecting agency findings to far less stringent standard).
145. Id. (refusing, on appeal, to consider EPA’s conclusion that biomass-burning generally constitutes BACT).
146. Id. (avoiding discussion of Chevron and Skidmore through application of
Baltimore Gas & Elec.).
147. Id. (upholding argued departure from traditional BACT analysis).
148. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1199-1200 (adopting EPA’s definition
of “control” over petitioners’ argument that burning biomass itself does nothing to
reduce GHG emissions).
149. See id. (rationalizing EPA’s avoidance of analyzing alternative control
technologies). The court acknowledged that the EPA summarily discussed and
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In addition, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the EPA was justified in refusing to assess different fuel stocks at step one.150 Because the agency had yet to make scientific findings distinguishing
between environmental impacts of burning different types of woodwaste, it could not be compelled to provide a “qualitative determination” in the instant scenario.151 The court, therefore, deemed
any negative effect of burning certain types of biomass an “indirect”
consequence that should be addressed in step four.152
Finally, because an independent environmental impact assessment was carried out under the assumption that thirty-five percent
of the fuel would be sourced from outside the facility, the Ninth
Circuit was satisfied that the EPA had addressed the effects of transporting fuel stocks to the plant.153 The Ninth Circuit further
looked favorably upon Sierra Pacific in light of its requests for restrictions on the biomass fuel stocks it was allowed to burn.154 The
EPA and Sierra Pacific’s agreed-upon restrictions were sufficient, in
the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, to assuage concerns that Sierra
Pacific would not abuse its permit by clear-cutting forests to feed its
power plant.155 Paying homage to the “evolving analysis of the environmental effect of different biomass fuels in the ever-developing
field of climate change science,” the court held that the EPA’s guidance and grant of the PSD permit was rational and consistent with
prior practice.156
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Helping Hand Tools, the Ninth Circuit correctly adopted and
applied the source redefinition analysis articulated by its sister cirrejected the possibility of imposing alternative requirements on Sierra Pacific to
reduce GHG emissions, such as efficient operation and maintenance routines and
good combustion practices. Id. at 1200.
150. Id. at 1200 (reiterating that EPA had yet to conduct independent research pertaining to GHG emissions from various types of biomass fuel).
151. See id. (calling for determination grounded in primary research).
152. See id. (citing EPA’s language in bioenergy guidance diminishing environmental impact of carbon dioxide released from certain biomass stocks).
153. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1200 (rewarding applicant’s self-imposed restrictions, which allowed Sierra Pacific to burn only readily available wood
wastes).
154. See id. (granting Sierra Pacific leeway in negotiating permitting restrictions).
155. See id. at 1200-01 (detailing reasoning why concerns that Sierra Pacific
would engage in environmentally harmful logging operations were insignificant).
156. Id. at 1200 (articulating outcome upholding Sierra Pacific’s PSD permit
and validity of Bioenergy Guidance).
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cuit in Sierra Club.157 The Ninth Circuit keenly navigated the “borderline case” analysis spelled out by Judge Posner, setting aside colocation of the facility and fuel source to determine the basic business purpose of the applicant.158 In doing so, the court provided
adequate justification for why Sierra Pacific’s self-imposed cap on
natural gas usage is permissible—that doing so would defeat Sierra
Pacific’s use of wood waste as fuel.159 For these reasons, the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis justifies its ruling on petitioners’ primary argument.160 The court’s treatment, however, of the novel issue
whether deference should be afforded to the EPA’s biogenic emissions rules sets concerning precedent in light of the EPA’s lack of
supporting evidence concerning the realistic benefits of biomassburning.161 Ultimately, the court’s faulty application of Supreme
Court precedent on the standard of review yields to agency action
at every turn, leading to the hasty conclusion that the EPA’s granting of the PSD permit was neither arbitrary nor capricious.162
A. The Court’s Misapplication of Baltimore Gas & Electric
The Ninth Circuit’s shortcomings in Helping Hand Tools can be
traced to its application of the “most deferential” standard of review
articulated in Baltimore Gas & Electric, and the court’s conclusions
regarding the sufficiency of the scientific record.163 Most importantly, the court failed to distinguish Baltimore Gas & Electric and the
case at hand: whereas the Supreme Court justified its deference to
the administrator in Baltimore Gas & Electric by noting the volumi157. For a detailed discussion regarding the court’s treatment of other circuits’ analyses, see supra notes 128-156 and accompanying text.
158. For an explanation of the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Sierra Club, see
supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
159. For a narrative overview of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis on the petitioners’ first contention arguing that the source-redefinition exception should not apply, see supra notes 132-139 and accompanying text.
160. See id. (explaining rationale underlying holding in Part III of opinion).
161. For an explanation of the potential impact of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, see infra notes 185-198 and accompanying text.
162. For a discussion of the court’s misapplication of decisions regarding the
standards of review, see infra notes 163-175 and accompanying text; see generally
Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1198 (alluding to turbulent status of current climate change research). The court noted “EPA currently lacks the scientific data at
this time to make such a quantitative determination and is actively collecting the
data to do in the future the type of analysis desired by the Center.” Id. For background information on scientific studies shaping the debate on greenhouse gas
regulations, see supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text.
163. For a more detailed description of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the
agency’s BACT analysis in Helping Hand Tools, see supra notes 140-156. For a discussion regarding the sufficiency of scientific support for agency policy statements,
see supra notes 106-127 and accompanying text.
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nous scientific evidence contained in the record, the Ninth Circuit
deferred to EPA’s unsupported predictions that biomass-burning
would, in most cases, constitute best available control technology.164 Here, the EPA’s scant evidence underlying its prediction,
and accordingly the Guidance as a whole, was a “consensus from
commenters on the [Call for Information].”165 As noted in the
Center for Biological Diversity’s Petition for Rehearing, the court
failed to recognize that the purported benefits of biomass combustion were buoyed by commenters’ suggestions that burning mill residues would have a negligible atmospheric impact.166 This blanket
assertion merely “appear[ed] credible” to the EPA.167 In support of
its conclusion, the EPA neglected to provide any external sources
within the most important section of its Bioenergy BACT Guidance.168 Accordingly, the court should not have reached the conclusion that the EPA’s actions “at the frontiers of science”
necessitated a deferential review, as the record supports only that
the EPA’s assertions lacked any basis in hard, scientific evidence
and were therefore arbitrary.169
164. Compare Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 98-100 (1983) (discussing scientific support behind Commission’s NEPA
analysis) with Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1200 and Bioenergy Guidance, supra
note 83, at 20-24, 28-29 (failing to cite substantial scientific findings in support of
general assertion that biomass burning is carbon neutral).
165. Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 21-23 (pointing to conclusions made
at public comment).
166. Id. at 23 (deferring to assertions made by interested parties).
For at least one category of biomass feedstocks that may be used in energy production, it does appear possible at this time to conclude that the
atmospheric impact is negligible. Some commenters on the CFI suggested that utilizing mill residue (e.g. sawdust, planar shavings, panel
trim) to generate energy, rather than leaving the residue to decompose,
likely would not cause emissions over and above that which would have
taken place if the energy use did not occur.
Id.; see also Petition for Rehearing and/or Modification of Opinion by Petitioner
Center for Biological Diversity at 2-6, Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, 848 F.3d 1185 (2016) (No. 14-72602) (arguing EPA’s predictions were
supported by arbitrary conclusions).
167. See Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 20-24 (discussing emissions released when using mill residue to generate energy). The guidance states, “Given
that this [residue] would have decomposed under natural circumstances in a short
period of time (e.g., [ten to fifteen] years) in the absence of utilization as
bioenergy, this conclusion appears credible.” Id. at 23.
168. See id. at 20-24 (explaining environmental impact of biomass burning
without citations to credible sources).
169. Compare Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d 1185,
1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (justifying deference given to EPA through agency’s elevated
level of expertise) with Nat. Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 735 F.3d
873, 881-84 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding scientific record was insufficient under
agency’s own standards to support grant of highest deference); see also Harnett,
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Were Baltimore Gas & Electric correctly distinguished, the Ninth
Circuit would have reached the question of whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applied.170 Unlike the agency determinations challenged in Baltimore Gas & Electric, which were contained within final
regulations and promulgated according to formal procedures, the
EPA’s predictions were located within informal guidance documentation created outside of the administrative procedural framework.171 While the EPA published its guidance pursuant to
authority granted under the CAA’s PSD provisions, the disclaimer
contained within the introduction as well as the pervasive references to the document’s tentative legal nature all support that the
Bioenergy BACT Guidance did not carry the force of law and thus
should not be afforded Chevron deference under Mead.172 If such a
finding were made, the EPA’s actions would be subject to the alternate standard of thoroughness, rational validity, and consistency
with prior and subsequent announcements under Skidmore.173 In
turn, the standard would be less likely to justify granting deference
to the agency, as Skidmore involves a weighing of “all those factors
which give [the agency determination] power to persuade.”174 The
EPA’s Bioenergy Guidance lacks a thoroughly developed body of
support such that the application of Skidmore would place it on the

supra note 11, at 596 (describing court’s ruling that agency’s opinion was insufficient to grant deference, even if scientific record was sufficient).
170. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1199 (declining to consider question
whether Chevron or Skidmore applies in light of deference due to scientific and technical expertise).
171. Compare Baltimore Gas & Elec., 462 U.S. at 89-90 (discussing commission’s
new regulations governing determinations of environmental impact of nuclear
power plant’s fuel cycle) with Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 1 (disclaiming
any effect that formally adopted regulations would have). Christensen also would
support that the EPA’s Bioenergy Guidance is not entitled to deference under
Chevron by virtue of the fact that rulemaking procedures were not followed but
would instead afford the Bioenergy Guidance persuasive “respect” per Skidmore.
Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (carving back application of
Chevron for various EPA interpretations).
172. See Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 1, 23 (describing non-legally
binding nature of guidance). For a detailed discussion of standards of review of
agency actions including Chevron and Mead, see supra notes 106-127 and accompanying text.
173. See United States v. Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001) (declining to
treat classification decisions as rules properly promulgated and having force of
law); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 at 140 (1944) (discussing lesser
standard of deference granted in circumstances where Chevron does not apply).
174. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 at 140; see Womack, supra note 115, at 294-95
(acknowledging that Skidmore, the default standard of review following Chevron and
Mead, generally affords less deference and more discretion to judges).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018

25

Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 7

364 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX: p. 339
same footing as did Baltimore Gas & Electric, which would require
the granting of less deference to the agency’s findings.175
B. The Court’s Failure to Adequately Address Differences
Among Biomass Fuel Stocks
While the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the EPA did not
consider the ramifications of burning different types of biomass
stocks in step one as petitioners claimed it should have, and correctly pointed to the EPA’s pending, yet incomplete research on
the matter, the court proceeded to make ill-advised claims that the
EPA and Sierra Pacific had engaged in discourse that justified the
absence of material restrictions on the source operator with respect
to the types of biomass wastes that could be used.176 Seemingly rewarding Sierra Pacific’s self-imposed restrictions on the types of biomass stocks available for consumption, the court never
acknowledged that Sierra Pacific’s sacrifice was hardly altruistic.177
Rather, Sierra Pacific had little to gain by obtaining permission to
burn merchantable forest biomass or whole trees removed through
clear-cutting because additional forest and mill residues brought
from other mills in the region would allow Sierra Pacific to run the
power plant closer to capacity.178 The court pointed to the less urgent concern that Sierra Pacific would clear-cut forests solely for
the purpose of converting wood into electricity and firing its drying
kiln.179 While well-intentioned, it remains unlikely that Sierra Pacific would engage in clear-cutting because its main avenue of business is producing lumber, not electricity.180 Indeed, arguments
made at public comment early in the application stage indicated
175. See Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 23-27 (relying on public comments to discuss methods of burning by which biomass could be carbon neutral).
The EPA inasmuch acknowledged the impracticality of collecting supporting data:
“a case-by-case analysis of the net atmospheric impact of biomass fuels would likely
be prohibitively time-consuming and complex for facilities and permitting authorities.” Id. at 23.
176. See Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1200-01 (failing to recognize EPA’s
issue permit imposed no restrictions on Sierra Pacific’s usage of certain biomass
stocks).
177. For a discussion of facts leading to the EPA’s amendment of Sierra Pacific’s PSD permit, see supra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
178. For a discussion on Sierra Pacific’s available biomass stocks, see supra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
179. Helping Hand Tools, 848 F.3d at 1201 (drawing attention to petitioners’
less dire underlying concern that Sierra Pacific would engage in unscrupulous
slash-and-burn practices); see also id. at 1193 (describing Sierra Pacific’s “basic business purpose”).
180. For a brief overview of Sierra Pacific’s business activities, see supra notes
20-21 and accompanying text.
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that the plant would serve to protect the community as well as Sierra Pacific’s lumber stocks by reducing wildfire risk and making
use of combustible wood waste on the forest floor.181
These facts gain relevance in light of the absence of any restriction on the proportion of consumed biomass that must be comprised of mill residues.182 The EPA promulgated its Biogenic BACT
guidance in response to its own preliminary conclusion that burning mill residues evidences an overall neutral effect on atmospheric
carbon dioxide levels. It thus follows that the EPA would desire to
ensure that at least some of the biomass burned under permits issued according to its new guidance were mill residues.183 Even
though the EPA specifically noted in its guidance that further research was required before it could reach similar conclusions with
respect to other types of biomass stocks, it permitted burning of
other biomass stocks with no accompanying effort to ensure that
greenhouse gas emissions were minimized.184
VI. IMPACT
The immediate result of Helping Hand Tools is a hard-fought
victory for lumber manufacturers, power companies, and biomass
industrialists in general.185 As applied in the context of “dirty fuels”
such as coal, the source redefinition exception affords great power
to permit applicants who seek to co-locate power generation facilities with fuel sources.186 By adopting the exception at the appellate
181. See Public Meeting: Receiving Public Comments on the Proposed Permit Modification of EPA’s Proposed PSD Permit for the Sierra Pacific Industries – Anderson Division,
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 12-14 (Dec. 10, 2013), https://www.regulations.gov/
contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-R09-OAR-2012-0634-0041&attachmentNum
ber=51&contentType=pdf (detailing concerns over potential for controlled fires to
burn out of control when set ablaze in midst of forest rather than at specialized
biomass-burning facilities). For further explanation of Sierra Pacific’s motivations
for building the facility, see supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
182. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit Proposed Pursuant to the Requirements at 40 CFR § 52.21, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION IX, 11-12 (Apr.
2014), http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cpcfa/meeting/2014/20140916/staff/
5e2.pdf [hereinafter Final Permit] (failing to require mill residue fuel quota).
183. See Bioenergy Guidance, supra note 83, at 23-24 (specifying that agency extended interim policy statement only to mill residues).
184. See id. at 24 (qualifying statements regarding beneficial aspects of burning biomass stocks); see also Final Permit, supra note 182, at 11-12 (permitting unrestrained use of fuel sources other than mill residues).
185. See Basu, supra note 6 (describing advocates’ push for formal government recognition of forest bioenergy as carbon-neutral fuel source).
186. See generally Prairie State, 13 E.A.D. 1, 18-19 (EAB 2006) (upholding practice of deferring to permit applicant’s own definition of proposed facility’s design
or business purpose); see also Sierra Club, 499 F.3d at 655 (declining, with caution,
to override EAB’s acceptance of applicant’s project definition in Prairie State).
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level, the court reduces source operators’ burdens for project planning at the expense of in-depth determinations of BACT, and ensures at least some security from EPA’s demands for usage of
alternative fuels.187 Essentially, Helping Hand Tools espouses rationale that ensures limited freedom from regulation for biomassburning facilities, notwithstanding the indefinite absence of any scientific affirmation of biomass’s carbon-neutrality.188
In contrast, the decision on petitioners’ challenge of the
Bioenergy BACT Guidance represents a decisive defeat for academics and environmentalists who object to cavalier pronouncements
of biomass-burning practices as broadly effective means of reducing
the country’s carbon footprint.189 While detractors have time remaining to challenge a binding adoption of such determinations in
legislation, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling places biomass facility operators beyond the purview of their objection in the interim.190 Furthermore, the court’s decision to apply Baltimore Gas & Electric here
lowers the bar for what constitutes agency action “at the frontiers of
science.”191 The operative effect of the court’s second holding is to
allow the EPA wide discretion in (1) broadcasting preliminary determinations in the first place while remaining unbound by formal
rulemaking procedures and (2) preserving these determinations by
committing to a lengthy process of scientific verification.192 It remains unclear whether the court’s hands-off approach was motivated by a desire to abstain from the greater biomass-burning
debate; nevertheless, while courts could previously rationalize
agency policy statements where the scientific record was “persuasive” under Skidmore, courts now also have a proper basis for engag187. For a discussion of the EPA’s 2010 and 2011 modifications to the BACT
analysis for biogenic carbon dioxide, see supra notes 80-94 and accompanying text.
188. For an overview of the discussion of the level of scientific support necessary to afford deference to agency determinations, see supra notes 121-127 and
accompanying text.
189. See Basu, supra note 6 (noting mixed, yet fervent opposition and support
from opposite sides of academic community).
190. See id. (relaying that pending legislation would define biomass-burning
as carbon-neutral).
191. See Meazell, supra note 126, at 751-52, 761 (describing recurring danger
of “science charade” spurred by “super deference” principles adopted by the Court
over time). For a further discussion of the jurisprudence of the applicable standard where an agency makes use of its unique expertise, see supra notes 121-127
and accompanying text.
192. See generally Helping Hand Tools v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 848 F.3d
1185, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that at time of Court’s decision EPA
had yet to complete research into accounting methods for biogenic carbon
emissions).
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ing in passive activism where an agency merely believes it could
justify the policy in the future.193
Although it also remains to be seen whether the disposition of
Helping Hand Tools will, in fact, lead to a net reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions as supporters of biogenic energy propose, the immediate effect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision is to engender disapproval of judicial oversight at the intersection between law and
science.194 Such oversight is necessary to balance “the risks that
flow from technological decisions.”195 In the context of biomassburning, the potential risk is that agencies will adopt policies mistakenly encouraging biomass-burning to the detriment of the public health they sought to advance.196 Not only is this risk
exacerbated by the mischaracterization of policy as science, but it is
also made more severe by courts’ unwillingness to identify unsupported assertions of a technical nature.197 Helping Hand Tools thus
stands as an impetus for courts hearing similar cases in the future to
give agency determinations undeserved deference.198
Joshua Schmid*

193. See id. (expressing doubt as to whether guidance would qualify for deference). For further explanation of the applicable standard where the agency acts
according to its own specialized knowledge, see supra notes 121-127 and accompanying text.
194. See Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the Need for
Institutional Reform, 94 HARV. L. REV. 489, 489-91 (1981) (explaining, in context of
nuclear power, tension between technological advancement and judiciary’s tempering such advancement pursuant to duties of oversight). “If the courts fail to
understand the intertwined procedural and technological dimensions of [cases involving complex and novel technology], the judicial process becomes a lottery in
which outcomes ultimately are determined by intuitive perceptions of the weight
of authority, rather than by reasoning from evidence.” Id. at 491.
195. Id. at 490 (warning of circumstances in which “technological enthusiasm
. . . overshadows[s] the constraints of legislative oversight and safety regulations”).
196. See generally Basu, supra note 6 (pointing to concerns over “legislat[ing]
scientific fact[s]” based upon newly gleaned knowledge of a nuanced field).
197. See Meazell, supra note 126, at 751-52 (warning against both inadvertent
and intentional characterizations of policy as science). Critics posit that “If agencies know that courts will be at their most deferential when reviewing scientific
determinations, they will rationally emphasize the scientific aspects of their decisions to the detriment of clearly identifying the policy decisions filling the scientific gaps.” Id. at 752.
198. For an examination of how the Ninth Circuit in Helping Hand Tools afforded undue deference to the EPA’s treatment of bioenergy sources, see supra
notes 163-175.
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